The present study applies empirical methods to the problem of predicting large U.S. commercial bank failures. Because of sampling limitations, scant research has examined the feasibility of using computer-based early warning systems (EWSs) to make such predictions. In the late 1980s and early 1990s numerous large banks failed in the United States, enabling us to collect a sample of 50 failed banks with more than $250 million in assets as well as a matched sample of 50 non-failed large banks. These samples were split into original and holdout samples of different sizes. Both the parametric method of logit analysis and the nonparametric approach of trait recognition are employed to (1) develop classification EWS models based on the original samples and (2) test the predictive ability of these models using the holdout samples. Both logit and trait recognition performed well in terms of classification results. However, over the holdout samples, trait recognition outperformed logit in a variety of tests, including overall accuracy, large bank failure accuracy, weighted efficiency scores, and stability using data from one year before, as well as two years before, failure. Other results from the trait recognition models reveal that complex two-and three-variable interactions between financial and accounting variables contain additional information about bank risk not found in the individual variables themselves. We conclude that nonparametric EWSs can provide valuable information about the future viability of large banks. 
I. Introduction
Seminal work by Beaver (1966) and Altman (1968) showed how computer-based models relying on accounting information could predict the failures of firms. Their work sparked a continuing stream of research in the corporate financial literature (e.g., see Beaver (1968) , Edmister (1972) , Blum (1975) , Altman, Haldeman, and Narayanan (1977) , Martin (1977) , Ohlson (1980) , Scott (1981) , McFadden (1983) , Zavgren (1985) , Jones (1987) , Keasey and McGuinness (1990) , Platt and Platt (1990) , Altman (1993) , Coats and Fant (1993) , Altman, Marco, and Varetto (1994) , Altman and Narayanan (1997) , and others). 1 Bank regulators are keenly interested in applying these methods to banks to supplement the information they receive from onsite examinations. Computer-based models could be used as early warning systems (EWSs) to help prevent some bank failures or reduce the cost of failure. Extensive research on failed banks has confirmed that computer-based models perform well as EWSs (e.g., see Meyer and Pifer (1970) , Stuhr and Van Wicklen (1974) , Sinkey (1975) , Santomero and Vinso (1977) , Bovenzi, Marino, and McFadden (1983) , Korobrow and Stuhr (1985) , West (1985) , Maddala (1986) , Lane, Looney, and Wansley (1986) , Whalen and Thomson (1988) , Espahbodi (1991) , Thomson (1993) , Kolari, Caputo, and Wagner (1996) , and others).
Few studies have sought to determine whether the failures of large banks are predictable.
Previous work on predicting large bank failures have focused on the usefulness of stock price data as a bank-specific EWS (e.g., see Pettway (1976 Pettway ( , 1980 , and Peavy and Hempel (1998) ).
Alternatively, several other studies have attempted to use the financial ratios of individual banks to predict their failure [e.g., see Sinkey (1985) and Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (1997)]); however, inadequate sample sizes have prevented analysts from studying large banks generically.
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In this regard, the search for ways to preclude the failures of large banks is becoming increasingly important, because the ongoing consolidation of the banking industry is increasing these banks' numbers (see Berger (1995) and Boyd and Graham (1996) ). Such consolidation raises new policy challenges for regulatory and government entities charged with the responsibility of ensuring the banking system's safety and soundness. One policy response to the potential dangers of banks that are too-big-to-fail (TBTF) (including competitive inequalities, moral hazard, and inefficiency) is to increase bank regulation of large institutions (see Hoenig (1999) ).
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The development of computer-based EWSs for large banks would be consistent with this policy. To create a database for such EWSs, we collected data from the period 1989 to 1992, when numerous large banks failed in the United States. We were able to gather a sample of 50 large failed banks with more than $250 million in assets. 4 Although a total of 50 large bank failures is large by historical standards, it is quite small in terms of minimum sampling requirements in most EWS models. It is common practice to split the sample of failed banks into (1) an original sample that gives rise to a classification model and (2) a holdout sample that is reserved for determining the EWS model's efficacy. In our case this sampling design leaves only 25 large failed banks in the original and holdout samples and only 25 large non-failed banks in the matched-pair (by size and location) original and holdout samples. Both parametric and nonparametric EWS models are tested using these samples. Because of its widespread application in previous finance and banking studies, the parametric approach of logit analysis was chosen. Also, we selected the nonparametric approach of trait recognition as applied to bank failures in Kolari, Caputo, and Wagner (1996) because of its reported usefulness on small samples. 5 A priori, we expect that nonparametric EWSs will experience less difficulties with small sample sizes than parametric EWSs because the latter models are likely to violate variable distribution assumptions. To further examine the effects of small samples of large banks on the EWSs, we repeat the comparative analyses using smaller original and holdout samples which have larger minimum asset sizes (e.g., a second sample with the largest 15 failed and 15 nonfailed banks and a third sample with the largest 10 failed and 10 non-failed banks in the original and holdout samples).
Using accounting data from both one year and two years prior to the failures, we found that computer-based EWSs are a viable means of evaluating large bank failure risk. Both logit and trait recognition performed well in the classification results of original samples; the accuracy rates were between 90 percent and 100 percent. However, with regard to the prediction results using holdout samples, trait recognition outperformed logit in such tests as overall accuracy, large bank failure accuracy, weighted efficiency scores, and stability using data from one year and two years prior. In regard to the main task of predicting large bank failures, a particularly noteworthy finding is that, while logit predicted large bank failures no better than chance in holdout samples, trait recognition was able to predict most of the large bank failures both one year and two years prior to collapse. Other results from the trait recognition models reveal that complex two-and three-variable interactions between financial and accounting variables contain information about bank risk not found in individual variables. We conclude that nonparametric EWSs can provide valuable information about the future viability of large banks.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section II overviews logit and trait recognition EWS models, section III describes our empirical methodology, section IV reports the empirical results, and section V provides a summary and conclusion.
II. EWS Models

Parametric Modeling Approach --Logit Analysis
A logistic distribution is used in many limited dependent variable applications. The resulting model (i.e., a logit model) is common in the EWS literature of finance and banking.
The posterior probability of failure can be derived directly from the following logit specification:
where P i = the probability of bank i's failure, and b = (b 1 , …, b n ) is a vector of regression coefficients for predictor variables X i (i = l, …, n). The logit model is preferred over the linear discriminant (MDA) model because it does not require multivariate normality among the independent variables and is computationally more tractable (see Espahbodi (1991, p. 56) ).
When the assumptions of MDA hold (namely, multivariate normality, equal variance-covariance matrices, and linearity), logit is equivalent to MDA.
Because of small sample sizes and the need to preserve degrees of freedom, we applied a stepwise logistic regression to select a subset of the most discriminating independent variables.
Since no variables entered the model at the 10 percent significance level, we used a 30 percent significance level. The general lack of significance of the independent variables can be partially attributed to the small sample sizes (i.e., the cumulative distribution of the error terms in the regression relationship may not approximate a logistic function).
Logit models (and many other EWS methods) generate coefficient estimates for each of the variables and associated test statistics that indicate how well they discriminate between failed and non-failed banks. However, there are some potential drawbacks in terms of interpreting the results. For example, it is not possible to determine whether a significant variable is more useful in identifying failed banks than non-failed banks (i.e., no information about a variable's ability to reduce Type I versus Type II errors is available). Also, it is not possible to determine which of the variables is "out of line" for a particular bank. Such distinctions must be made in a univariate context by comparing mean values of variables in failed and non-failed banks.
Trait Recognition Approach
In this section, we briefly describe in general terms trait recognition as an EWS method.
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For a more in-depth description of the technique, see the appendix. Building a trait recognition model is a multi-step process. The procedure involves: (1) selecting cutpoints for each of the variables, (2) assigning the variables binary codes, (3) constructing a trait matrix for each observation, (4) identifying good and bad traits (or distinctive features), and (5) selecting classification rules for the voting matrix. The model is evaluated for its ability to predict failed and non-failed banks in a holdout sample using the voting matrix. As already mentioned, trait recognition is a nonparametric EWS approach that relies on no statistical or distributional assumptions about the predictor variables.
A unique aspect of trait recognition is that it gathers and exploits information contained in complex interactions of variables. Individual traits are constructed from different segments of the distribution of each variable and the interactions of these segments with one or more other variables' segmented distributions. As an example, a trait of a failing bank could be a moderate level of return on assets and a high level of nonperforming loans as a proportion of total loans.
Alternatively, a trait could be a moderate level of return on assets and a low level of equity capital to total assets. Notice that, upon dividing variables' distributions into low, middle, and upper segments, numerous interaction traits can be constructed between any two variables. This type of (binary) interaction variable captures different information than one can get by simply multiplying one variable by another variable, as typically done in finance, economics, and other fields of study.
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Once all possible traits of the variables are tabulated for all banks, trait recognition uses a search routine to cull traits that do not discriminate between failed and non-failed banks.
Traditionally, EWS methods select one set of discriminatory variables; by contrast, trait recognition specifies two sets of discriminators: (1) safe traits associated with non-fail banks, and (2) unsafe traits associated with failing ones. These safe and unsafe traits are known as features.
By tallying the number of safe and unsafe features for each bank, sample banks can be placed in a voting matrix defined by the number of safe and unsafe votes. Finally, the researcher selects rules for determining which cells in the voting matrix are safe (dominated by failed banks) or unsafe (dominated by non-failed banks) so that the observations can be used to classify and predict.
The trait recognition algorithm automatically builds the network of interactions with only a moderate amount of researcher input at various stages of its development (known as the learning phase). In contrast to neural networks in which interactions between variables are in a so-called hidden layer, trait recognition enables researchers to interpret the final results easily using a catalog of all interactions between variables in the model as reflected in the features.
Unlike logit and other EWS methods, trait recognition produces variables (i.e., safe and unsafe features) that are clearly associated with either failed or non-failed banks. Simply by looking at the voting matrix, one can find a bank's position with respect to any variable as well as its standing relative to other banks. Since a record for each bank is provided that details its specific safe and unsafe features, it is obvious which features are out of line for any particular bank.
III. Empirical Methodology
Bank Samples
All U.S. commercial banks with assets greater than $250 million closed by the FDIC in the period 1989-1992 make up the large failed bank sample (n = 50). To create a matched-pair sample, we selected large non-failed banks for these failed banks according to the following criteria: (1) location in the same market as proxied by MSA and (2) nearest in asset size to the failed bank in the month of failure. The first criterion controls for size as a factor in failure. The second criterion controls for a difference in regulatory treatment and financial flexibility between large banks and small banks, as observed by Cole and Gunther (1994) . Since our sample's total asset distribution ranges from $250 million to $14 billion, size differences can be substantial.
While the matched-pair sampling design controls for such differences to some degree, we also conducted further analyses of the largest 30 failed banks (assets greater than $500 million), in addition to the largest 20 failed banks (assets greater than $700 million). These runs focus on progressively larger failed banks and further test the EWS capability of computer-based models using accounting data.
The second matching criterion attempts to control for different economic and competitive regional conditions among large banks across the country. During the period under study, most of the bank failures were concentrated in oil-dependent states (e.g., Texas) and areas where oncebooming real estate had "busted" (e.g., the Northeast). Severe financial distress in some regional banking sectors no doubt disrupted the normal market behavior of many banks. These factors are discounted as much as possible by ensuring that each matched pair of failed and non-failed banks are from the same location.
Analyses are run both one year and two years prior to bank failures. While the failed bank sample remains the same in both of these runs, the matched-pair samples change because some paired non-failing banks do not pass the size-matching criterion. Out of 50 matched-pair non-failed banks in the one-year-prior sample, about 20 percent were replaced in the two-yearsprior sample by another non-failing bank.
The matched pairs of 50 failed and 50 non-failed banks for one year and two years prior to failure were ordered by failed bank size and divided equally into an original sample and a holdout sample by using every other matched pair. The original samples were used to build the bank failure classification models, and the holdout samples were used to investigate the predictive power of the logit and trait recognition models. Table 1 gives details of these bank samples. We have listed the names of the failed banks but not those of the non-failed banks (in order to avoid possible market reactions to our analyses of these banks). In most cases the matched non-failed bank's asset size is within 30 percent of that of the corresponding failed bank. In an effort to partially reflect the temporal behavior of the variables, variability measures were calculated. For example, based on data over the four quarters prior to failure for a particular bank, we calculated the maximum difference between quarters for a variable divided by its mean level over the four quarters. Presumably the financial performance of banks nearing collapse will vary from the norms. Since some banks have sudden changes in asset size prior to failure, we added another measure of size stability that used the mean change (rather than mean level) in total assets.
Independent Variables
As shown in table 2, the mean values of the independent variables for the failed banks are significantly different from those for non-failed banks. Denoted by asterisks, the variables that have significant (at the 10 percent level) t-statistics for mean differences between failed and nonfailed banks in all samples are X7 (profitability), X9 (capitalization), and X13 (credit risk). In addition, the variables X2, X5, X9, X15, X16, X20, X21, X22, and X25 are significantly different for failed and non-failed banks in at least one sample. Of these variables, X8, X10, X16, and X21 are variability measures and the remainder are in levels. Altogether, 14 out of 28 variables in table 2 have significantly different means in one or more of the four sample sets of data.
Parametric models such as logit tend to select variables based on the strength of the statistical relationship characterized in univariate tests. The 14 variables cited above are most likely to be prominent variables in the logit models. By contrast, nonparametric models such as trait recognition may well be expected to be influenced by other predictors because they are not grounded in statistical properties. Table 3 reports the estimated logit model for each bank sample and related classification and prediction results. The models employed about 40 percent of the 28 independent variables.
IV. Empirical Results
Logit Models
As expected, the variables with significant univariate t-statistics for mean differences in table 2 are frequently significant in the multivariate logit models.
As shown in table 3, the classification results for the logit models using the original samples are quite strong using data from one year prior to failure (panel A) and two years prior These results suggest that the logit approach performs well within sample.
Table 3 also shows that the logit prediction results using the ho ldout samples are moderately accurate, with the percentage correct falling to between 60 percent and 75 percent.
In the n = 50 and n = 30 samples the one-year-prior models outperformed the two-years-prior models, and vice versa for the n = 20 sample. Since the results for one-year-prior and two-yearsprior models are mixed, we infer that the model's predictive ability was not substantially affected by extending the forecasting horizon from one year to two years. Unfortunately, the EWS efficacy of the logit models is suspect because between 40 percent and 65 percent of the failed banks are not predicted to fail (Type I errors). Because of the magnitude of such errors, one must question the value of the model to bank regulatory agencies. We infer that, although the logit models have a moderate degree of overall predictive power, their out-of-sample performance is not better than random chance in the case of large bank failures.
Trait Recognition Models
Tables 4 to 6 contain the results for the trait recognition models. For purposes of documentation, table 4 lists the trait recognition cutpoints for each of the 28 independent variables using the original sample (n = 50). Cutpoints were automatically generated one standard deviation above and below the variable means. As discussed in the previous section, two cutpoints for each variable divide their distributions into three segments for purposes of binary coding of the variables and subsequent construction of binary strings for each bank. Table 5 provides further documentation of the trait recognition models by listing the safe and unsafe features employed in the one-year-prior and two-years-prior models (as shown in panels A and B, respectively) for the original sample (n = 50). Notice that the only variable that is not incorporated in the features is X28, which is calculated as the ratio X1/X2 (or bank total assets divided by holding company total assets). Unlike the logit models, the trait recognition method employed all variables as predictors, with the exception of variables with redundant information contained in interactions of other variables. Table 6 reports the classification and prediction results for the trait recognition models.
All six original sample runs (i.e., one-year-prior and two-years-prior data models using n = 50, n = 30, and n = 20 banks) obtained 100 percent correct classification. Concerning predictive ability on the holdout samples, the trait recognition models correctly identified from 63 percent to 95 percent of large banks. In contrast to the logit results, the one-year-prior results in panel A of table 6 (i.e., 80 percent to 95 percent predictive accuracy) consistently attained a higher predictive accuracy than the two-years-prior results in panel B (i.e., 63 percent to 70 percent).
Also unlike the logit models' results, the trait recognition models tended to perform well above chance in predicting failing banks. In the one-year-prior models 23 out of 25, 11 out of 15 and 10 out of 10 failures are correctly predicted in the samples with n = 50, n = 30, and n = 20, respectively. In the two-years-prior models, 17 out of 25, 10 out of 15, and 8 out of 10 are correctly predicted in the aforementioned sample sizes, respectively. These Type I error results are considerably stronger than those obtained from the logit models, which had considerable difficulty in predicting large bank failures in the holdout samples. Notably, in all six test cases using one-year-prior and two-years-prior data and different sample sizes, trait recognition correctly predicted a greater number of failures than logit.
Weighted Efficiency Scores
In table 7 we report the weighted efficiency (WE) scores for logit versus trait recognition models. The WE scores, as noted by Espahbodie (1991), adjust overall prediction rates for the fact that Type I errors are more serious than Type II errors. The WE scores indicate that the trait recognition models outperformed the logit models in all samples. The former models did especially well using one-year-prior data. (For example, based on the n = 20 sample containing the largest banks, the one-year-prior WE score is 86.4 for the trait recognition model and 24.0 for the logit model.) These results suggest that the trait recognition model may be an effective early warning system (EWS) for large banks.
Stability of Predictions for Individual Large Banks
Lastly, details of the prediction results for each of the failed banks in the holdout samples based on the logit and trait recognition models are presented in tables 8 and 9, respectively. In table 8 we report the predicted probabilities of failure estimated by the logit models using the different sample sizes. The incorrectly classified failing banks are marked with an asterisk.
Given that the banks are shown in rank order, it is apparent that there is no systematic bias toward missing the largest bank failures in the samples. However, an unfavorable pattern in the predicted probabilities for the failed banks is that they are normally either 1.0 or 0.0 (i.e., no chance of survival or failure, respectively). Because estimated probabilities of failure are consistently extreme the logit results may not be very reliable. Also, the logit models give inconsistent predictions for individual large failed banks using one-year-prior and two-prior models -that is, both logit models correctly predicted only seven failures in the n = 25 failed bank sample, four failures in the n = 15 failed bank sample, and three failures in the n = 10 failed bank sample. Thus, not only do the one-year-prior and two-years-prior models perform no better than chance in predicting large bank failures, the predictions are not stable for any particular large bank as the failure event approaches. Table 9 details the number of safe and unsafe votes obtained for each large failed bank using the trait recognition models for the different sample sizes. As before, missed predictions are marked with an asterisk. While some of the misclassified failed banks had no unsafe votes (i.e., tantamount to zero probability of failure using logit), most of the misclassified banks did have one or more unsafe votes. Also, for the correctly identified failed banks, the number of safe and unsafe votes varies considerably from one sample to another, and these differences imply greater or lesser risk of failure. Hence, unlike the logit results, the trait recognition results can convey the degree to which the risk of failure is growing. Finally, comparing the predictions based on the one-year-prior and two-years-prior models, in the n = 25, n = 15, and n =10 samples of failed banks, the number of failures predicted by both models is 18, 8, and 8, respectively.
These results are more stable than those for logit and suggest that the trait recognition models
give fairly consistent EWS signals about large banks using one-year-prior and two-years-prior data.
IV. Summary and Conclusions
The present study empirically examined the efficacy of using computer-based EWS models to assess the risk of failure of large U.S. commercial banks. Because of a lack of sufficient data points in the past, few studies have been published on this subject, with the exception of studies of stock prices and failure risk and case studies of individual large bank failures. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, numerous large banks failed in the United States.
These failures allowed us to gather a sample of 50 large banks with more than $250 million in assets. To them, we added a matched-pair sample of 50 large non-failed banks. Using these data, we compared the predictive ability of logit analysis, a parametric approach, with that of trait recognition, a nonparametric approach.
While both EWS methods performed well in terms of classification accuracy using original samples, trait recognition outperformed logit in a variety of tests using holdout samples.
Based on one-year-prior and two-years-prior models and different holdout samples, the predictive accuracy of the logit models was moderately successful. By comparison, the predictions of trait recognition models were substantially accurate using one-year-prior and two-years-prior data. Trait recognition was able to predict most of the failures both one and two years prior to collapse. And trait recognition's ability to identify a higher number of failing large banks than logit was not achieved by misclassifying a greater number of non-failing banks. The weighted efficiency scores for trait recognition models surpassed those of logit models in all test cases. Further results from the evaluation of the individual large banks' risks of failure one year and two years prior to failure suggested that trait recognition provided more stable EWS signals than logit in the years preceding failure.
We conclude that trait recognition is a potentially useful early warning system for large We believe EWS models developed on a one-year-prior or two-years-prior performance window are useful as supervisory tools. Accurately identifying large banks that are likely to fail within the next two years may provide sufficient time for supervisors to impose restrictions that reduce resolution costs. However, a one-or two-year window may be too narrow for implementing corrective actions to avert failure/closure. Models that identify problem banks three years or even four years prior to failure/closure may be more useful as EWS tools for the purpose of implementing corrective actions to avoid failure. However, identifying problem banks so early in their decline using only publicly available data is much more difficult empirically. Selecting reliable samples and designing a practicable model will be formidable tasks. 
2.
Bank failure or closure is a supervisory action that occurs when the regulators recognize book-valued insolvency, a condition that may not be consistent with the timing of marketvalued insolvency. It is essentially an administrative option that reflects the condition of the bank but is applied at the discretion of the banking authorities (see Demirguc-Kunt (1992) for a more detailed discussion on the differences between insolvency, failure, and closure). The failure model presented below does not predict either book-or market-valued insolvency per se. That is, the model is not designed to measure or forecast the solvency of specific institutions or attempt to identify factors that suggest a bank will be insolvent in the near future. A more complex analysis of the expected market value of equity would be required to address that issue. The development of an empirical insolvency-based prediction model is made more difficult because the regulator may intervene to force changes that may avert insolvency. Also, the intangible value of a bank's liabilities is difficult to measure from industry-level data such as call report data but can be important when troubled banks are purchased.
3.
Another possible policy response to large bank fragility and the potential for systemic risk is to increase market discipline (see Kaufman (1999) ).
4.
According to FDIC Annual Reports, the total number of U.S. failed banks (by year) in this period was as follows: 207 (1989), 169 (1990), 127 (1991), and 127 (1992) . This pace of failures far surpassed the historical average of fewer than 25 banks per year.
5. This small sample facility of trait recognition is also apparent in previous applications to geophysics problems involving the prediction of seismic risk (e.g., see Gelfand et al. (1976 ), Briggs, Press, and Guberman (1977 ), Caputo et al. (1980 , Benavidez and Caputo (1988)) and mineral deposits (e.g., see Bongard et al. (1966) and Briggs and Press (1977) ).
6.
In the present study we employ the Bongard et al. (1966) algorithm used in geophysical studies, which has been generalized by Kolari et al. (1966) to finance and economics problems.
7.
As a further example, the traits method explores numerous interactions between any two variables X1 and X2. Given the use of two cutpoints for each variable's distribution, the interactions between the segments of the two variables' distributions can be written as follows (where L = lower segment of the variable distribution, LM = lower and middle segments, MU = middle and upper segments, and U = upper segment):
If three variables are considered, it is obvious that a large number of complex interactions are possible between the different segments of their distributions.
8. By inference, it seems plausible that a similar finding is possible in other areas of finance that use accounting and financial data to predict such outcomes as private nonfinancial firm failure, bond ratings, etc.
9.
Given the success of the interaction variables in the trait recognition models, we contemplated including interaction variables in the logit models. However, while the 28 predictors can be taken two at a time and then three at a time to define a large number of interaction variables (more than 1,000 new variable definitions), this type of exhaustive exploratory search is not consistent with its application in the finance and banking literature.
Nor is it designed to explore a vast number of possible variable interactions. Also, as mentioned, the standard practice of constructing interaction variables by means of multiplicative transformations would not capture the more complex and numerous interactions captured by trait recognition.
Appendix. Description of Trait Recognition
In this section we describe the steps involved in building a trait recognition model (see Kolari et al. (1996) ). Figures 1 to 3 give a simple example for illustrative purposes. We assume that the sample consists of five failed banks (denoted a, b, c, d, and e) and five non-failed banks (denoted A, B, C, D, and E). Also, we assume that three financial ratios -namely, X1 = net income/total assets, X2 = loan losses/total assets, and X3 = equity capital/total assets -are used to measure bank financial condition. Each ratio is calculated one year prior to the collapse of the failed banks for the 10 banks under examination.
Step 1 -Recoding the variables into binary strings. Recoding can be done using a general partitioning rule or researcher intuition. A general partitioning rule may take the following form: one standard deviation around the sample mean is calculated and the distribution of values for a particular variable is partitioned into three segments using two Alternatively, the researcher could produce graphs of the distributions of the variables and then visually select two cutpoints for each variable. In this way the researcher derives the cutpoints based on experience and intuition. This option provides the researcher with a good grasp of the raw data entering the model, as well as control over the binary coding process.
Researcher judgment is used to set thresholds at which the value of a variable is considered low or high (e.g., regulatory practice applies specific capital ratios to divide banks into wellcapitalized, adequately capitalized, and undercapitalized groups). The general notion is to set the cutpoints such that the low segment has primarily (for example) failed banks and vice versa for the upper segment. The middle segment is a mix of failed and non-failed banks. At times only one cutpoint is possible because there is no clear middle segment (i.e., only low and upper segments are coded). Also, some variables have distributions that have failed and non-failed banks mixed throughout their distribution. In those cases the variable can either be dropped or a cutpoint can be selected based on theory or practice. We illustrate the recoding process in panel A of figure 1. In this example the distributions for X1, X2, and X3, as well as the cutpoints selected by the researcher, are presented. Based on figure 1 , the 10 sample banks are coded into binary strings, as shown in panel B. Finally, it should be noted that more than three segments are possible and a different binary code could be assigned to each region (e.g., a three-digit code); however, previous research has suggested that having more than three segments does not substantively increase predictive power.
While the binary coding of a continuous variable would seem to throw out cardinal level data, the cost of this loss of information is offset by: (1) the ability to construct a variety of complex interaction variables that are not possible with cardinal data (to be discussed shortly), and (2) the advantage of applying fuzzy logic to capture general patterns in the data. Regarding the latter advantage, because the model is dependent on general patterns in the variables, trait recognition is less data-sensitive than models using cardinal variable measurements to outlier biases. This emphasis on general patterns may contribute to a more stable model over time than methods that focus on small increments in variables.
Step 2 -The binary strings are converted to trait matrices. Notice that the individual bank binary strings in the trait matrix have different patterns, with the exception of failed banks c and d with the identical string 011100. Furthermore, there appear to be patterns in these binary strings that distinguish failed from non-failed banks; for example, X1 (or profit rate) and X3 (or capital ratio) tend to have 0 codes for failed banks and 1 codes for non-failed banks, whereas X2
(or loans/assets ratio) normally has 1 codes for failed banks and 0 codes for non-failed banks.
These different patterns suggest that the binary strings may be useful in discriminating between failed and non-failed banks. For example, the trait matrix for failed bank e with binary string 110100 can be created by considering all possible combinations of the six digits taken one, two, and three at a time as follows:
________ ________ ________ p q r PQR p q r PQR p q r PQR 1 1 1 111 2 3 3 100 1 2 4 111 2 2 2 111 2 4 4 111 1 2 5 110 3 3 3 000 2 5 5 100 1 2 6 110 4 4 4 111 2 6 6 100 2 3 4 101 5 5 5 000 3 4 4 011 2 3 5 100 6 6 6 000 3 5 5 000 2 3 6 100 1 2 2 111 3 6 6 000 2 4 5 110 1 3 3 100 4 5 5 100 2 4 6 110 1 4 4 111 4 6 6 100 3 4 5 010 1 5 5 100 5 6 6 000 3 4 6 010 1 6 6 100 1 2 3 110 4 5 6 100
As shown above, there are 33 traits for this six-digit string. 4 Notice that the traits matrix allows for all possible interactions of the segmented variables' distributions. The trait 111111 points only to variable X1, where the location of the bank is the upper segment of X1's distribution.
Trait 133100 points to variables X1 and X2, where X1 is in the upper segment of its distribution, and X2 is in the lower or middle segments of its distribution (see figure 2) . Likewise, trait 236100 points to variables X1, X2, and X3, where X1 is in the middle or upper segments, X2 is in the lower or middle segments, and X3 is in the lower segment. Notice that the combination 236100 is identical to 632001, such that the latter trait is redundant and can be dropped from consideration. A different traits matrix is generated for each bank with a different binary string.
Step 3 -The features in the trait matrices are retained. Since the size of the traits matrix increases greatly as the number of digits in the binary string increases (because of factorial mathematics), and each bank has its own traits matrix, even problems with only 10 independent variables can quickly exhaust computer disk space. So, only traits that are useful in discriminating between failing and non-failed banks are retained. These traits are known as features. A safe feature is a trait that is present frequently in non-failed banks but infrequently in failed banks, and vice versa for unsafe features. For example, if a particular trait (or six-digit sequence of binary codes) is found in a minimum of 75 percent of the failed banks and a maximum of 25 percent of the non-failed banks, it could be designated as an unsafe feature.
(The percentages defining safe features and unsafe ones are of necessity ad hoc.) Previous work by Kolari et al., as well as our own experience, suggests that at least five safe and five unsafe features (i.e., 10 total features) are needed to discriminate between failed and non-failed banks.
Also, using as many as 100 safe or unsafe features is excessive and does not make the model more discriminating. In general, the researcher should experiment with relaxing minimum and maximum percentage limits to increase the number of safe and unsafe features and observe whether the model is more discriminating. Setting strict percentage limits tends to throw out valuable information that can increase the model's performance, while lenient limits collects excess information with marginal incremental discriminatory power (or no added predictive value). Finally, the traits program filters out features that duplicate the observations of some other feature.
Step 4 EWSs, the original sample traits program typically yields 100 percent correct classification.
If there are few observations and the number of features is quite high so that a large voting matrix is created (e.g., 60x60 matrix with 3,600 cells but only 40 observations), most cells will be unclassified and the aforementioned simple decision rule will be applied to most observations in a holdout sample. The holdout sample classification results are weaker in this instance than could be obtained by using a smaller voting matrix with fewer unclassified cells and a greater proportion of cells classified as safe or unsafe based on the original sample data. In effect, concrete decision rules determined by the original sample data are more effective in holdout sample prediction than naïve rules that simply count the number of safe and unsafe votes and then classify a cell on that basis alone. In this regard, a benefit of the voting matrix is a visualization of the pattern of failed and non-failed banks in the twodimensional space defined by safe and unsafe features. One might intuit from panel C of figure   3 , by casual inspection it is intuitively obvious that banks with two or more unsafe features are very likely failing and that banks with one unsafe feature are suspect. The voting matrix enables the analyst to quickly understand where an individual bank under investigation lies in the safe and unsafe features space relative to other banks.
Step 5 -A two-stage model is developed under certain conditions. We added another step to the traits program analysis if a considerable proportion of our sample banks inhabited mixed cells. In Kolari et al. (1996) the classification results were improved by using multiple stages of traits models. The first stage model is used to classify banks that are easily identified as failing or non-failing. Banks that fall in mixed cells (or gray areas) are held out as a separate subsample, and an entirely new traits model is developed to identify these banks. This procedure takes advantage of the fact that the traits program works well with small numbers of observations. Additionally, the program focuses attention on banks in gray areas, which are the crux of most classification problems. We arbitrarily set the minimum number of banks in mixed cells at 10 failed banks and 10 non-failed banks to allow sufficient observations to build a second model if needed.
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